| Abstract: |
Noting that any set of perceptually applied concepts could apply equally to different things or to identical things at different times, the present author questions how identical perceptions, once they are applied to different things, can be distinguished from one another. Possible ways in which identical perceptions can be differentiated are discussed, including the criteria of reflective perception, naive realistic perception, and causality. The present author also considers J. R. Searles’s (1983) proposal that the intentional content of perception has a causal, self-referential character, which distinguishes it from any other perception. It is shown how Searles’s proposal of intentional content fails to offer a full solution to the initial question of how to tell seemingly identical perceptions apart. The present author concludes that concrete perceptual reference depends on the special ways in which perceptual experience is realized in consciousness and in phenomenal properties. It is this qualitative realization of experience that shows what causes the perception and illustrates the experience of it, independent of any other perception. (32 ref) ((c) 1999 APA/PsycINFO, all rights reserved) |