| Abstract: |
Discusses J. J. Gibson’s (e.g., 1966, 1979, 1982) theory and the distinction between perceiving and its component stream of perceptual experience. T. J. Lombardo’s objections to viewing perceptual awareness as a product and as a main process are considered. Lombardo argues that perceptual awareness is not a brain process; it occurs, rather, at the ecological level of organization. In effect, this contradicts Gibson’s theory, which holds (1) that information pick-up, but not extraction, occurs at the interface between perceiving and environment, and (2) perceptual experience (awareness), in contrast to perceiving, is not publicly observable, as it would be by definition if it occurred at the ecological level of organization. Additional examples of how the author has used the distinction between the activity of perceiving and the perceptual experience are presented. ((c) 1999 APA/PsycINFO, all rights reserved) |