| Abstract: |
Discusses B. F. Skinner’s (see PA, Vol 72:29643, 29644, 29645, 29646, 29647, and 29936) replies to evaluations, criticisms, clarifications, and extensions of his general radical behaviorist psychological theory and philosophy. Topics discussed include (1) the existence of mental events; (2) advice for psychologists; (3) thoughts, beliefs, perceptions, memories, and feelings; (4) inner reference as stimulus control; (5) choosing a suitable introspective utterance; (6) indeterminacy of meaning; (7) the external relation of responding; (8) nonequivalence of feelings and private stimulation; (9) Skinner’s self-observations of pain; (10) a hypothesis of dual introspective awareness; (11) primary introspective awareness; and (12) Skinner’s reaction to sensation classification. It is concluded that if operant behavioral control by events, states, or processes in the brain is a fact, then Skinner will have to find a way by which such behaviors in the brain produce other than proprioceptive forms of private stimulation. ((c) 1999 APA/PsycINFO, all rights reserved) |