| FORM: | ARTICLE |
| Author: | Natsoulas, Thomas |
| Affiliation: | U California, Davis, USA |
| Title: | On the radical behaviorist conception of pain experience. |
| Source: | Journal of Mind & Behavior, 1988 Win, 1988. 9 (1): p.29-56 |
| Language: | English |
| Subjects: | Thesaurus terms: Behaviorism Conscious (Personality Factor) Pain Perception Self Perception Theories |
| Added Keywords: | limitation of Skinner’s radical behaviorism theory of consciousness, explanation of self conscious experience of pain |
| Classification Code: | Sensory Perception (2320) |
| Population Terms: Human | |
| Abstract: | Argues that the theory of consciousness developed by Skinner (1976) does little to explain the personal experience of pain. It is argued that radical behaviorism can no longer afford to ignore the scientific challenge to explain people’s self-conscious experience of pain, which is more complex than simply acknowledging sensory perception through nerve endings. It is noted that radical behaviorists seem to be divided between those who interpret Skinner’s writings on consciousness as being fully explicable according to stimulusesponse patterns and those who deny that Skinner ever addressed the problem of consciousness. ((c) 1999 APA/PsycINFO, all rights reserved) |