| FORM: | ARTICLE |
| Author: | Natsoulas, Thomas |
| Affiliation: | U California, Davis, USA |
| Title: | “I am not the subject of this thought”: Understanding a unique relation of special ownership with the help of David Woodruff Smith: II. |
| Source: | Imagination, Cognition & Personality, 1991-1992. 11 (4): p.331-352 |
| Language: | English |
| Subjects: | Thesaurus terms: Cognitions |
| Added Keywords: | special ownership between mental occurrence instances & their subjects, application of D. W. Smith’s phenomenology |
| Classification Code: | Cognitive Processes (2340) |
| Population Terms: Human | |
| Abstract: | Discusses the unique relation of special ownership (R) that exists between mental-occurrence instances and the one who is their subject (P). R is not a simple matter of P’s mental-occurrence instances occurring in P’s body and P’s directly taking them to be P’s own. D. W. Smith’s phenomenology is useful in providing a lead regarding what R is. The “species content” of a mental-occurrence instance, which includes sensuous or qualitative content, acquaints P with the large mental-physiological process of which the mental-occurrence instance is a product and part. P is constituted, ultimately, of such recurrent mental-physiological processes, which produce and include as a small part the mental-occurrence instances that Smith’s phenomenology addresses. Under some conditions, these large processes produce and include “alienated” mental-occurrence instances. ((c) 1999 APA/PsycINFO, all rights reserved) |