| FORM: | ARTICLE |
| Author: | Natsoulas, Thomas |
| Affiliation: | U California, Davis, USA |
| Title: | “I am not the subject of this thought”: Understanding a unique relation of special ownership with the help of David Woodruff Smith: I. |
| Source: | Imagination, Cognition & Personality, 1991-1992. 11 (3): p.279-302 |
| Language: | English |
| Subjects: | Thesaurus terms: Cognitions Consciousness States Phenomenology |
| Added Keywords: | application of D. Smith’s phenomenological account of consciousness to special ownership of mental occurrence instances |
| Classification Code: | Consciousness States (2380) |
| Population Terms: Human | |
| Abstract: | Based on D. W. Smith’s (1986) phenomenological account of consciousness, the unique relation of special ownership (R) that exists between every mental-occurrence instance (MOI) and its subject, the one who “has” or “lives” the MOI, is examined. The subject is assumed to be a person or animal, although mentioned in passing are cerebral hemispheres as possible subjects of MOIs. Using Smith’s perspective, special attention is given to “alienated” mental occurrences. These are taken by their subject either (1) as not having a subject (as being “impersonal”) or (2) as having a different subject from their actual subject. The key to R may lie in the referent of the phenomenological “species character” of each MOI. This referent is the subject’s particular mental activity (e.g., seeing) of which the MOI is a part and product. ((c) 1999 APA/PsycINFO, all rights reserved) |