| Abstract: |
Addressed here are certain relations among intentionality, consciousness, and subjectivity that J. R. Searle (e.g., 1983, 1989) has been calling attention to while arguing that certain brain-occurrences possess irreducibly subjective features in the sense that no amount of strictly objective, 3rd-person information about the animal and his/her brain and behavior could result in a description of any such features, except by inference based on 1st-person perspective. Searle has focused on the aspectual shapes of conscious mental brain-occurrences. However, Searle’s view would seem, undesirably, to conceive of aspectual shape as purely appearential. This appears to be an abandonment of ontological subjectivity. Throughout the present article, Freud’s conception of consciousness serves as an aid to understanding Searle’s views of subjectivity, consciousness, and intentionality. ((c) 1999 APA/PsycINFO, all rights reserved) |