| FORM: | ARTICLE |
| Author: | Natsoulas, Thomas |
| Affiliation: | U California, Davis, USA |
| Title: | Intentionality, consciousness, and subjectivity. |
| Source: | Journal of Mind & Behavior, 1992 Sum, 1992. 13 (3): p.281-308 |
| Language: | English |
| Subjects: | Thesaurus terms: Consciousness States Objectivity |
| Added Keywords: | J. Searle’s views on intentionality & consciousness & subjectivity |
| Classification Code: | Consciousness States (2380) |
| Population Terms: Human | |
| Abstract: | Explores the grounds for restricting intrinsic intentionality (intentional contents, aspectual shapes), tracing them to J. R. Searle’s (1990) conviction that aspectual shapes (intentional contents) must be “manifest” whenever actually exemplified by an instance of any mental brain occurrence. By manifest, Searle seems to mean that aspectual shapes must be contents and, at the same time, objects of the states whose contents they are. This is accomplished due to the self-intimating character of all conscious states. The present discussion is an extension of the work of T. Natsoulas (see record 1992-11246-001). ((c) 1999 APA/PsycINFO, all rights reserved) |