| FORM: | ARTICLE |
| Author: | Natsoulas, Thomas |
| Affiliation: | U California, Davis, USA |
| Title: | Is consciousness what psychologists actually examine? |
| Source: | American Journal of Psychology, 1992 Fal, 1992. 105 (3): p.363-384 |
| Language: | English |
| Publication Type: Comment | |
| Subjects: | Thesaurus terms: Conscious (Personality Factor) Motor Processes Phenomenology Visual Perception Perception Professional Criticism |
| Added Keywords: | consciousness or phenomenal experience as essence of psychological studies, discussion of thesis of A. J. Marcel & study on visual guidance of locomotion of J. J. Gibson |
| Classification Code: | Human Experimental Psychology (2300) |
| Population Terms: Human | |
| Abstract: | Discusses the thesis of A. J. Marcel (1988) that “consciousness is what psychologists actually examine.” By consciousness, Marcel means phenomenal experience and includes reports based on direct acquaintance with phenomenal experience (although such reports are usually objects of secondary, methodological interest). In support of Marcel’s thesis, it is argued that common reports that psychologists collect in studies of perception, and so on, actually report phenomenal experiences of particular kinds. J. J. Gibson’s (1979) account for the visual guidance of locomotion is driven back to direct acquaintance with phenomenal experience. If Gibson’s account is correct, then much more behavior than reporting behavior depends on acquaintance with phenomenal experience. The claim that one can visually guide one’s behavior by means of a nonconscious process that selects what to do based on nonconscious visual representations is also discussed. ((c) 1999 APA/PsycINFO, all rights reserved) |