| FORM: | ARTICLE |
| Author: | Natsoulas, Thomas |
| Affiliation: | U California, Davis, USA |
| Title: | Are all instances of phenomenal experience conscious in the sense of their being objects of inner (second-order) consciousness? |
| Source: | American Journal of Psychology, 1992 Win, 1992. 105 (4): p.605-612 |
| Language: | English |
| Publication Type: Comment | |
| Subjects: | Thesaurus terms: Cognitive Psychology Conscious (Personality Factor) Phenomenology Professional Criticism Reply |
| Added Keywords: | consciousness or phenomenal experience as essence of cognitive psychological studies, commentary reply |
| Classification Code: | Cognitive Processes (2340) |
| Population Terms: Human | |
| Abstract: | Replies to the critiques by B. J. Baars (see record 1993-20250-001) and R. A. Carlson (see record 1993-20255-001) concerning the author’s original article (see record 1993-08172-001) on consciousness. The author addresses issues of phenomenal experience and inner (second-order) consciousness. ((c) 1999 APA/PsycINFO, all rights reserved) |