| FORM: | ARTICLE |
| Author: | Natsoulas, Thomas |
| Affiliation: | U California, Davis, USA |
| Title: | Freud and consciousness: VIII. Conscious psychical processes perforce involve higher-order consciousness–intrinsically or concomitantly? A current issue. |
| Source: | Psychoanalysis & Contemporary Thought, 1993. 16 (4): p.597-631 |
| Language: | English |
| Subjects: | Thesaurus terms: Conscious (Personality Factor) Consciousness States Freud (Sigmund) Unconscious (Personality Factor) Psychoanalytic Theory |
| Added Keywords: | Freud’s vs D. M. Rosenthal’s views of intrinsicalness vs concomitance in higher order consciousness |
| Classification Code: | Psychoanalytic Theory (3143) |
| Population Terms: Human | |
| Abstract: | Contrasts the views of Freud and D. M. Rosenthal regarding intrinsicalness and concomitance in higher order consciousness. Freud held that consciousness is an intrinsic property of certain mental states and cannot literally be acquired by preconscious or unconscious mental states. Rosenthal argues that any mental state is rendered conscious by a thought which affirms the occurrence of that particular mental state and takes place at roughly the same time, provided no additional thought of inference occurs. It follows that any one of Freud’s dynamically unconscious mental states would be rendered conscious by the noninferential thoughts affirming its occurrence. An argument contra Rosenthal is presented with reference to Freud’s 3 components of intrinsic consciousness. ((c) 1999 APA/PsycINFO, all rights reserved) |