| FORM: | ARTICLE |
| Author: | Natsoulas, Thomas |
| Affiliation: | U California, Davis, CA, USA |
| Title: | The case for intrinsic theory: III. Intrinsic inner awareness and the problem of straightforward objectification. |
| Source: | Journal of Mind & Behavior, 1998 Win, 1998. 19 (1): p.1-20 Reference. |
| Language: | English |
| Publication Type: Empirical Study | |
| Subjects: | Thesaurus terms: Awareness Cognitions Metacognition Philosophies |
| Added Keywords: | involvement of inner awareness in objectivating mental acts & problem of straightforward objectivation, intrinsic theory & theories of A. Gurwitsch |
| Classification Code: | Philosophy (2630) |
| Population Terms: Human | |
| Abstract: | The phenomenologist and intrinsic theorist of consciousness A. Gurwitsch (1964, 1985) contends that every objectivating mental act necessarily involves inner awareness; when an objectivating act occurs, it is an intentional object of unmediated apprehension. Inner awareness is literally intrinsic to every objectivating mental act, a part of its own structure. Gurwitsch argues that inner awareness is merely a concomitant part of that structure, taking place at the margin of the objectivating act, for the reason that the content of inner awareness is not relevant to the content of the thematic process at the core of the act. However, Gurwitsch assigns an essential function to inner awareness by virtue of its content; namely, it helps to constitute the act as a unitary phenomenon over time. Perhaps, theoretically relegating inner awareness to the margin of an objectivating act is merely an effort to allow for straightforward objectivation without falling into inconsistency. That is, some objectivating acts seem not to include inner awareness. ((c) 1999 APA/PsycINFO, all rights reserved) |