| FORM: | ARTICLE |
| Author: | Natsoulas, Thomas |
| Affiliation: | U California, Dept of Psychology, Davis, USA |
| Title: | Gibson’s environment, Husserl’sLebenswelt, the world of physics, and the rejection of phenomenal objects. |
| Source: | American Journal of Psychology, 1994 Fal, 1994. 107 (3): p.327-358 |
| Language: | English |
| Subjects: | Thesaurus terms: Consciousness States Environment Phenomenology |
| Added Keywords: | comparison of J. J. Gibson’s ecological science & E. Husserl’s lebenswelt & rejection of phenomenal objects as part of human consciousness |
| Classification Code: | History & Systems (2140) |
| Population Terms: Human | |
| Abstract: | Uses theoretical accounts and arguments from J. J. Gibson (1979 [1986]) and E. Husserl (1913 [1983]) to reject the doctrine that phenomenal matters comprise the intentional objects of perceptual consciousness. The relation, in Gibson’s view, between the ecological environment and the world of physics, including Gibson’s proposed ecological science (GES) is addressed. Rather than deferring to physical science for what is actually there and can be perceived, GES holds that there is only one world where human beings and animals live and which physicists and other scientists study. GES is compared with Husserl’s concept of thelebenswelt(life-world), which consists of all that concretely exists and can give, by being perceived, meaning and validity to the claims of all the sciences, including the “technique” of physics. ((c) 1999 APA/PsycINFO, all rights reserved) |