| FORM: | ARTICLE |
| Author: | Natsoulas, Thomas |
| Affiliation: | U California, Dept of Psychology, Davis, USA |
| Title: | The concept of consciousness-sub-4: The reflective meaning. |
| Source: | Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 1994 Dec, 1994. 24 (4): p.373-400 |
| Language: | English |
| Subjects: | Thesaurus terms: Consciousness States Metacognition Philosophies Word Meaning |
| Added Keywords: | philosophical meaning in 4th concept of consciousness |
| Classification Code: | Philosophy (2630) |
| Population Terms: Human | |
| Abstract: | Addresses the 4th concept of consciousness (C-sub-4) that the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) defines in its 6 main entries under the wordconsciousness. This concept of C-sub-4 is introduced by identifying the previous 3 OED concepts of consciousness previously discussed (T. Natsoulas; e.g., see record 1991-33107-001) and by indicating how those 3 concepts are related to the referents of the concept of C-sub-4. C-sub-4 refers to the technical use of the word in philosophy, that is, the individual’s recognition of his or her own mental-occurrence instances. In discussing C-sub-4, the author considers 2 competing accounts that figure prominently in the OED entry, namely the intrinsic, self-intimational account of W. Hamilton (1895) and the inner-eye, perception-like account of J. Locke (1894). Both of these accounts are very much with us today. ((c) 1999 APA/PsycINFO, all rights reserved) |