| FORM: | ARTICLE |
| Author: | Natsoulas, Thomas |
| Affiliation: | U California, Psychology Dept, Davis, CA, USA |
| Title: | The stream of consciousness:XI. A critique of James’s appendage theory of consciousness (second part). |
| Source: | Imagination, Cognition & Personality, 1996. 16 (1): p.63-82 Reference. |
| Language: | English |
| Subjects: | Thesaurus terms: Awareness Consciousness States James (William) Self Concept Theories |
| Added Keywords: | critique of W. James’s appendage theory of consciousness & inner awareness |
| Classification Code: | History & Systems (2140) |
| Population Terms: Human | |
| Abstract: | Discusses W. James’s account of inner awareness as it is expressed inThe Principles of Psychology. Inner awareness is the immediate awareness which we all have of some of our own mental-occurrence instances. An essential part of what it is for a mental-occurrence instance to be conscious, or to be a state of consciousness, is an actual or potential immediate awareness of it. Appendage theories hold that inner awareness requires a distinct mental-occurrence instance that has the respective conscious mental-occurrence instance as its object. Intrinsic theories argue that every conscious mental-occurrence instance includes, in its own structure, awareness of itself. On James’s account, it is the total brain process that normally brings into existence any mental-occurrence instance, or basic durational component of the stream of consciousness. And then, this brain process often produces a further component of the stream that gives immediate awareness of the first component. ((c) 1999 APA/PsycINFO, all rights reserved) |