| FORM: | ARTICLE |
| Author: | Natsoulas, Thomas |
| Affiliation: | U California, Dept of Psychology, Davis, CA, USA |
| Title: | The presence of environmental objects to perceptual consciousness: Consideration of the problem with special reference to Husserl’s phenomenological account. |
| Source: | Journal of Mind & Behavior, 1996 Spr, 1996. 17 (2): p.161-184Reference. |
| Language: | English |
| Subjects: | Thesaurus terms: Consciousness States Perception Phenomenology Theories |
| Added Keywords: | E. Husserl’s phenomenological account of presence of environmental objects in perceptual consciousness |
| Classification Code: | Philosophy (2630) |
| Population Terms: Human | |
| Abstract: | In the succession of states of consciousness that constitute W. James’s stream of consciousness, there occur, among others, states of consciousness that are themselves, or that include, perceptual mental acts. It is assumed some of the latter states of consciousness are purely perceptual, lacking both imaginal and signitive contents. According to E. Husserl, purely perceptual acts present to consciousness, uniquely, their environmental objects in themselves, in person. They do not present, as imaginal mental acts do, an image or other representation of their object. Husserl’s theory resembles J. Gibson’s with respect to perception’s being direct. Both theorists hold perceptual awareness of the environment is not a “founded” act; its proximate causation does not involve any other mental act. Both theorists contend that perceptual acts keep the perceiver directly in touch with the surrounding environment. The present article considers Husserl’s account of this directness. Although this account has problems, and is largely phenomenological description, it may help psychologists to find their way to an adequate account of the objects of perceptual consciousness. ((c) 1999 APA/PsycINFO, all rights reserved) |