| FORM: | ARTICLE |
| Author: | Natsoulas, Thomas |
| Affiliation: | U California, Psychology Dept, Davis, CA, USA |
| Title: | The stream of consciousness: XIV. Two contrasting accounts of pervasive bodily self-awareness. |
| Source: | Imagination, Cognition & Personality, 1997. 17 (1): p.45-64 Reference. |
| Language: | English |
| Subjects: | Thesaurus terms: Body Awareness Consciousness States James (William) Personality Theories |
| Added Keywords: | W. James’ vs A. Gurwitsch’s account of role of bodily awareness in structure of the components of stream of consciousness & personal identity |
| Classification Code: | Consciousness States (2380) |
| Population Terms: Human | |
| Abstract: | journal abstract The present installment in this series of articles continues in consideration of the role that bodily self-awareness plays in the very structure of the basic durational components constituting William James’s stream of consciousness. The focus here is dual, on both the prominent phenomenologist Aron Gurwitsch’s account of this role and on James’s account. Critically addressed is Gurwitsch’s claim concerning the awareness of the behaviors involved in the process of perceiving. Such awareness is proposed to be typically marginal, in the sense of having a distinct and separate content within each component of the stream. Addressed too is James’s account of pervasive bodily self-awareness as integrated within each state, or pulse, of consciousness although varying in attentiveness. Such awareness is always part of, at least, the fringe of every pulse of consciousness, which is not to be confused with Gurwitsch’s margin. The present article explains how the awareness of bodily feelings is crucial to James’s account of personal identity. ((c) 1999 APA/PsycINFO, all rights reserved) |