| FORM: | ARTICLE |
| Author: | Natsoulas, Thomas |
| Affiliation: | U California, Dept of Psychology, Davis, CA, USA |
| Title: | The presence of environmental objects to perceptual consciousness: An integrative, ecological and phenomenological approach. |
| Source: | Journal of Mind & Behavior, 1997 Fal, 1997. 18 (4): p.371-390Reference. |
| Language: | English |
| Subjects: | Thesaurus terms: Consciousness States Environment Perception |
| Added Keywords: | presence of environmental objects to perceptual consciousness |
| Classification Code: | Consciousness States (2380) |
| Abstract: | Presents a sequel to a recently published article (T. Natsoulas, 1996), in which the author sought to make more available to psychologists E. Husserl’s attempted explanation of how perceptual mental acts succeed in presenting to consciousness their external, environmental objects themselves, as opposed to some kind of representation of them. This article continues the exposition of Husserl’s effort and, as well, begins a project of seeking to bridge the gap between his phenomenological account of perceptual presence to consciousness and J. J. Gibson’s (1986 [1979]) ecological conception of direct perception. The concern is with what happens at the juncture of (1) the perceptual system’s resonance to the stimulus energy flux and (2) the perceiver’s awareness of those environmental objects, events, properties, and relations which are specified by the informational variables that the picked-up stimulus flux instantiates. It is believed that simultaneously considering the environment’s phenomenological perceptual presence from both sides of the great epistemic divide–from the ecological outside and from the phenomenological inside–is worth a serious try. ((c) 1999 APA/PsycINFO, all rights reserved) |