| FORM: | ARTICLE |
| Author: | Natsoulas, Thomas |
| Affiliation: | U California, Davis |
| Title: | The Subjective, Experiential Element in Perception. |
| Source: | Psychological Bulletin, 1974 Oct, 1974. 81 (10): p.611-631 Reference. |
| Language: | English |
| Subjects: | Thesaurus terms: Consciousness States Perception General Topics: APA Journals |
| Added Keywords: | subjective & experiential elements, perception & perceptual imaginal awareness |
| Classification Code: | Human Experimental Psychology (2300) |
| Population Terms: Human | |
| Abstract: | Discusses the problem of sentience and how we are to understand it. It is argued, among other things, that sentience can find its place in psychological theory only in relation to perception and other modes of awareness. Basic issues examined pertain to the subjective, experiential element in perception and to the qualitative contents of perceptual and imaginal awarenesses. These issues are basic to the theory of the percept (and image) and have to do with where and how to locate the experiential element in a materialist world view. Subjective knowledge of qualitative contents is no less structural than knowledge by description; any advantage that exists is in respect to a mode of knowing rather than in what can be known about them. The Subject “participates” in what he comes to know, but such participation does not make for knowledge unique to him. Nor does what he knows by this route count against qualitative contents belonging to brain processes, except perhaps for the problematic property of “grain.” The discussion proceeds via review and evaluation of a variety of relevant views and arguments. (101 ref) ((c) 1999 APA/PsycINFO, all rights reserved) |