| FORM: | ARTICLE |
| Author: | Natsoulas, Thomas |
| Affiliation: | U California, Davis |
| Title: | Consciousness: Consideration of an inferential hypothesis. |
| Source: | Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 1977 Apr, 1977. 7 (1): p.29-39Reference. |
| Language: | English |
| Subjects: | Thesaurus terms: Awareness Consciousness States Theories |
| Added Keywords: | consciousness, direct awareness vs inferential hypothesis |
| Classification Code: | History & SystemsConsciousness States (2140) (2380) |
| Population Terms: Human | |
| Abstract: | Discusses the controversy between the view that there is direct awareness of consciousness and the opposing view, exemplified by D. O. Hebb, that direct awareness does not exist and consciousness is only an inference from observation, or from internal representations of sensory origin (IRSO). Disagreements in different introspector reports are not conclusive evidence against direct awareness and for the inferential view; they suggest only that introspector preconceptions are possible independent variables. On the other hand, noticing something about an IRSO is to notice the nervous system process that suggests the existence of noninferential awareness, at least at the beginning and at transitional points of inferential chains. (21 ref) ((c) 1999 APA/PsycINFO, all rights reserved) |