| FORM: | ARTICLE |
| Author: | Natsoulas, Thomas |
| Affiliation: | U California, Davis |
| Title: | The experience of a conscious self. |
| Source: | Journal of Mind & Behavior, 1983 Fal, 1983. 4 (4): p.451-478 Reference. |
| Language: | English |
| Subjects: | Thesaurus terms: Awareness Conscious (Personality Factor) |
| Added Keywords: | argument against existence of inner conscious self |
| Classification Code: | History & Systems (2140) |
| Population Terms: Human | |
| Abstract: | Argues that there is no inner conscious subject. Insofar as a mental episode may be said to have a subject or to be had by a conscious self, it is always the self-aware human being who is its subject. The human being’s experience of a conscious self, as being distinct from him/herself, amounts to a natural dissociation produced by the human being’s self-awarenesses. There is a strong tendency to distinguish anything of which one is aware from that which is aware of it. This leaves an inner subject of which one cannot be aware but to which one has learned to make a purported reference each time one is directly aware of a mental episode. The relational interpretation of awareness, H. Plessner’s (1961) concept of the human being’s essential “eccentric positionality,” and the perspective of objective psychology are discussed. (70 ref) ((c) 1999 APA/PsycINFO, all rights reserved) |