| Abstract: |
Discusses G. H. Mead’s (e.g., 1934) conception of consciousness, focusing on his 2 main concepts of consciousness. The 2nd of Mead’s concepts refers to phenomena that arise in human conduct from a context provided by the 1st type of consciousness–the “consciousness qua experience.” Mead suggested that experience is what it is concretely, and people may respond to experience or treat it in different ways depending on their purposes, which alter subsequent experience. The fact that the reality of a part of experience is brought into question does not make the doubted part any less objective or environmental or any more private or internal, particularly when what is experienced is shared by others. The 2nd concept, “consciousness qua awareness,” is described as a concept that develops out of social interaction within a world that is already there in experience and is determined in its immediate continuation by the behavior that occurs. Consciousness qua awareness is discussed in terms of the individual as a social object, whether only selves are aware, awareness as self-address, and the generalized other as audience. (24 ref) ((c) 1999 APA/PsycINFO, all rights reserved) |