| FORM: | ARTICLE |
| Author: | Natsoulas, Thomas |
| Affiliation: | U California, Davis |
| Title: | An introduction to the perceptual kind of conception of direct (reflective) consciousness. |
| Source: | Journal of Mind & Behavior, 1985 Sum, 1985. 6 (3): p.333-356 Reference. |
| Language: | English |
| Subjects: | Thesaurus terms: Consciousness States Self Perception |
| Added Keywords: | perceptual conception of direct reflective consciousness |
| Classification Code: | Consciousness States (2380) |
| Population Terms: Human | |
| Abstract: | Considers consciousness (direct reflective awareness of a person’s own mental episodes) from the perspective of the perceptual kind of conception of this inner access. Consciousness in the present sense is distinguished from other kinds of consciousness. The perceptual kind of conception of direct (reflective) consciousness is distinguished from inner-sense, self-intimational, behaviorist, and inferential conceptions. After some motivational comments, close attention is given to the perceptual kind of conception in the context of the last version of J. J. Gibson’s (1979) visual perception theory. Gibson generally interpreted perceptual experiences as being fundamentally nonconceptual kinds of occurrence; by taking such a stand, he ruled out an account of reflexive perceptions as being informed by a conceptual system that pertains to how the environment appears to one. (41 ref) ((c) 1999 APA/PsycINFO, all rights reserved) |